lukestein’s Twitter Archive—№ 1,598

1/N: Ten great papers (from 400+ submitted!) at the ASU Finance Conf., but I want to highlight two that show the breadth of financial economics: - The Impact of the Opioid Crisis on Firm Value and Investment - Organized Crime and Firms: Evidence from Italy blogs.wpcarey.asu.edu/financeconference/?page_id=353
Permalink On twitter.com ♻️ 8 Retweets ❤️ 19 Favorites 2019 Feb 23 Mood 0

…in reply to @lukestein
2/ Elena Simintzi presents “The Impact of the Opioid Crisis on Firm Value and Investment” (with Ouimet and Ye). Uses geographic variation in opioid use/legislation to understand their effect on firms. blogs.wpcarey.asu.edu/financeconference/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Ouimet_Simintzi_Ye_Feb2019.pdf
Permalink On twitter.com ♻️ 7 Retweets ❤️ 6 Favorites 2019 Feb 23 Mood -3 🙁

…in reply to @lukestein
3/ Counties hardest hit by opioid epidemic have falling quantity and quality labor supply. → Local firms have lower performance and value. → Local firms invest in physical capital and automation to substitute away from labor!
Permalink On twitter.com ♻️ 5 Retweets ❤️ 1 Favorite 2019 Feb 23 Mood +1 🙂

…in reply to @lukestein
4/ Also, consistent with the suggested mechanism: When states pass opioid-reducing legislation, local firms’ stock prices increase, especially at labor-intensive (/low-IT) firms. This great paper connects evidence from firm behavior and financial markets.
Permalink On twitter.com ♻️ 4 Retweets ❤️ 3 Favorites 2019 Feb 23 Mood +4 🙂

…in reply to @lukestein
5/ An amazing discussion. Miao (Ben) Zhang does *new analysis* to suggest that exposure to import competition (using Autor 🇨🇳🇺🇸 and Bustos 🇧🇷🇦🇷 shocks) might play a role, affecting opioids, workers, firm values, and automation.
Permalink On twitter.com ♻️ 4 Retweets ❤️ 3 Favorites 2019 Feb 23 Mood +2 🙂

…in reply to @lukestein
6/ Pablo Slutzky presents “Organized Crime and Firms: Evidence from Italy” (with Stefan Zeume) OC has revenue ≈1.5% of world GDP [!], and OC associated with poor economic growth. Why? In particular, how does OC affect firms? blogs.wpcarey.asu.edu/financeconference/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Organized-Crime-Slutzky-Zeume.pdf
Permalink On twitter.com ♻️ 5 Retweets ❤️ 4 Favorites 2019 Feb 23 Mood -3 🙁

…in reply to @lukestein
7/ Uses panel variation in local anti-mafia police efforts using data on 30,000+ asset confiscations in 400+ municipalities. Outcomes from financial statements on 800,000+ firms (incl. all LLCs!).
Permalink On twitter.com ♻️ 4 Retweets ❤️ 1 Favorite 2019 Feb 23 Mood +2 🙂

…in reply to @lukestein
8/ Anti-mafia enforcement → Much higher firm turnover (more entry and more exit) → More innovation → More competition in public procurement auctions Mafia seems to protect firms in non-tradable sectors from competition Firms founded when local mafia powerful more affected
On twitter.com ♻️ 4 Retweets ❤️ 3 Favorites 2019 Feb 23 Mood +3 🙂

…in reply to @lukestein
9/ We saw eight great presentations on the cross section of expected returns, multi-horizon risk-return tradeoffs, delegated asset management, business groups, investment manager compensation, sovereign debt, managerial decision-making, human capital in financial markets. So…
Permalink On twitter.com ♻️ 4 Retweets ❤️ 2 Favorites 2019 Feb 23 Mood +3 🙂

…in reply to @lukestein
10/10 Financial economists work on the “traditional” topics you might have in mind, and I love and do that kind of research. (E.g., corporate governance, banking/intermediation, asset pricing.) But we work on all kinds of other stuff too! — fin —
Permalink On twitter.com ♻️ 4 Retweets ❤️ 6 Favorites 2019 Feb 23 Mood +7 🙂