lukestein’s avatarlukestein’s Twitter Archive—№ 12,992

      1. Excited for @BabsonFinance seminar on a cool new paper by Hadlock, Jing Huang (E&Y), Paul Obermann (U Alabama) and Joshua Pierce (U Alabama) New data on S&P1500 division mngrs matched to segment performance. Connect managers to their CEOs (schools, prior employers, social orgs) @BabsonFinance/1456608341594185746
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    1. …in reply to @lukestein
      Managers who are connected with the CEO: • MUCH less likely to depart/more likely to get promoted • No performance–dismissal sensitivity (it’s there for the unconnected) • ≈ Same for hired vs. inherited connections! Good for the shareholders? Hard to say but…
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  1. …in reply to @lukestein
    …looks like this “friends-with-benefits” situation is bad: • Outside labor market outcomes after departure much poorer for dismissed connected managers than unconnected (the “retread” market) • Appointing connected managers not associated with performance improvements
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    1. …in reply to @lukestein
      Also learned about their other fun paper in @ILRReview on how rookie TT finance profs tend to publish if they're hired by co-nationals (spoiler alert: not well) vs. alums of their grad school (spoiler alert: well; access to private info?) journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0019793919896755
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